Rorty on hermeneutical injustice, liberal redescription and utopian imagination
My purpose is to use Miranda Frickers’ concepts of “testimonial injustice” and “hermeneutical injustice” to draw a distinction between the policy of tolerance and the policy of solidarity in Rortyan liberalism. I shall focus on the policy of solidarity interpreted as unfolding in two phases of the i...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | Argentina |
| Institución: | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
| Repositorio: | CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/124450 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/124450 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | CRITICAL IMAGINATION HERMENEUTICAL INJUSTICE LIBERAL REDESCRIPTION MARXISM UTOPIAN IMAGINATION https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
| Sumario: | My purpose is to use Miranda Frickers’ concepts of “testimonial injustice” and “hermeneutical injustice” to draw a distinction between the policy of tolerance and the policy of solidarity in Rortyan liberalism. I shall focus on the policy of solidarity interpreted as unfolding in two phases of the imagination: the phase of critical imagination and the phase of utopian imagination. I hold that critical imagination may be understood as focusing on overcoming hermeneutical injustice through what I term liberal redescription. Lastly, I critique the Rortyan project regarding what I view as an inadequate inclination to restrict critical imagination on the basis of adopting a criterion that focuses on flaws in the development of utopian imagination and that collides with the claim to overcome hermeneutical injustice. |
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