| Resumo: | In this essay the idea of "public reason" of John Rawls in his potentiality is examined and projected, firstly, with regard to the rationality of certain fundamental human rights, as the freedom of conscience, the freedom of education and of association, which a democratic constitutional state shaped on the ground of the political conception of the justice as fairness, must guarantee in the framework of a reasonable pluralism. Secondly, I aim to show starting from some anthropological topics developed from St Augustin and H. Arendt, the ontological base of the cultural and political pluralism, to articulate it with the theory of the political liberalism and its conception of the political unit of the state. Thirdly, the tension between 'the rational thing" and 'the reasonable thing" in Rawls is analyzed and checked, to show the anchorage of a dual conceptuation, cultural and political of the public reason. Finally, I trace in the theoretical frame of the political liberalism the dialectics of the public dual reason in an alive democracy.
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