Validity, dialetheism and self-reference
It has been argued recently (Beall in Spandrels of truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; Beall and Murzi J Philos 110:143–165, 2013) that dialetheist theories are unable to express the concept of naive validity. In this paper, we will show that (Formula presented.) can be non-trivially expan...
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2018 |
| Country: | Argentina |
| Institution: | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
| Repository: | CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/96448 |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/96448 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | PARACONSISTENCY PARADOXES SELF-REFERENCE VALIDITY https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
| Summary: | It has been argued recently (Beall in Spandrels of truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009; Beall and Murzi J Philos 110:143–165, 2013) that dialetheist theories are unable to express the concept of naive validity. In this paper, we will show that (Formula presented.) can be non-trivially expanded with a naive validity predicate. The resulting theory, (Formula presented.) reaches this goal by adopting a weak self-referential procedure. We show that (Formula presented.) is sound and complete with respect to the three-sided sequent calculus (Formula presented.). Moreover, (Formula presented.) can be safely expanded with a transparent truth predicate. We will also present an alternative theory (Formula presented.), which includes a non-deterministic validity predicate. |
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