The Knowability Argument and the syntactic type-theoretic approach
Recently, there have been some attempts to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as pr...
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| Format: | article |
| Status: | Published version |
| Publication Date: | 2013 |
| Country: | Argentina |
| Institution: | Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas |
| Repository: | CONICET Digital (CONICET) |
| Language: | English |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ri.conicet.gov.ar:11336/9158 |
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/11336/9158 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Knowability Argument Type-theoretic approach Self-reference Multimodal Paradoxes https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6.3 https://purl.org/becyt/ford/6 |
| Summary: | Recently, there have been some attempts to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as predicates, a new kind of paradox appears. I claim that avoiding this paradox either by weakening the Knowability Principle or by introducing types for both predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also consider the prospect of using the truth predicate to emulate necessity, knowledge and other modal notions. It turns out that this idea works much better. |
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