From propositional language to transcendental ethics in the Tractatus: the meaning and meaninglessness of utterances

The article analyzes the problem of transcendental ethics in Wittgenstein’s work, particularly in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of propositions lies in their relation to facts, that is, in their capacity to represent true or false logical configurations....

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Trinidad Felipe, Mishell
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2025
País:Perú
Institución:Universidad Femenina del Sagrado Corazón
Repositorio:Revistas - Universidad Femenina del Sagrado Corazón
Idioma:español
OAI Identifier:oai:ojs.revistas.unife.edu.pe:article/3416
Acceso en línea:https://revistas.unife.edu.pe/index.php/phainomenon/article/view/3416
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Hechos
Ética trascendental
Espacio lógico
Juicios morales
Juicios de valor
Facts
Transcendental ethics
logical space
Moral judgements
Value judgements
Descripción
Sumario:The article analyzes the problem of transcendental ethics in Wittgenstein’s work, particularly in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. According to Wittgenstein, the meaning of propositions lies in their relation to facts, that is, in their capacity to represent true or false logical configurations. Statements that do not correspond to facts are situated outside the world and the logical space. In this framework, aphorism 6.421 states that ethics is transcendental because it does not address any facts of the world. Moral and value judgments, not being rooted in logical space, cannot constitute propositions in the Wittgensteinian sense. However, this does not imply that they lack meaning (sinnlos). On the contrary, such judgments influence the configuration of the facts that constitute the subject. The aim of the article is, therefore, twofold: first, to identify the meaning of moral and value judgments, and second, to distinguish it from the meaning of propositions. It is argued that, although ethical judgments are not inscribed in the logical space, they possess a meaning of their own that cannot be reduced or dismissed as insignificant.