The Koinōnia of Non-Being and Logos in the Sophist Account of Falsehood

At Sophist 260e3-261a2, the Eleatic Stranger claims that in order to demonstrate that falsehood is, he and Theaetetus must first track down what speech (logos), opinion (doxa), and appearance (phantasia) are, and then observe the communion (koinōnia) that speech, opinion, and appearance have with no...

ver descrição completa

Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor: Wiitala, Michael
Formato: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2022
País:Perú
Recursos:Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Repositorio:PUCP-Institucional
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.pucp.edu.pe:20.500.14657/185794
Acesso em linha:http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/25069/23762
https://doi.org/10.18800/arete.199901-02.010
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Falsehood
false statement
Non-being
Truth
Plato
Sophist
Koinōniai
Logos
Falsedad
Afirmación falsa
No-ser
Verdad
Platón
Sofista
Koinōníai
Lógos
https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#6.03.01
Descrição
Resumo:At Sophist 260e3-261a2, the Eleatic Stranger claims that in order to demonstrate that falsehood is, he and Theaetetus must first track down what speech (logos), opinion (doxa), and appearance (phantasia) are, and then observe the communion (koinōnia) that speech, opinion, and appearance have with non-being. The Stranger, however, never explicitly discusses the communion of speech, opinion, and appearance with non-being. Yet presumably their communion is implicit in his account of falsehood, given his claim that observing that communion is needed in order to demonstrate that falsehood is (260e5-a2). This essay seeks to make the communion that speech has with non-being explicit. I argue that speech has communion with non-being in that the things and actions speech combines together by means of nouns and verbs need not be combined in a way that reveals (δηλοῖ) how the being a given speech is about combines ontologically with other beings.