On Collusion and Industry Size
In this paper we investigate the connection between the number of competitors and the sustainability of collusion within the context of a infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot model where only a subset of firms cooperate. We show that, in our model, an increase in the number of cartel firms may incr...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | Perú |
| Institución: | Universidad ESAN |
| Repositorio: | ESAN-Institucional |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.esan.edu.pe:20.500.12640/3407 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12640/3407 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Collusion Sustainability Fringe Colusión Sostenibilidad Margen https://purl.org/pe-repo/ocde/ford#5.02.04 |
| Sumario: | In this paper we investigate the connection between the number of competitors and the sustainability of collusion within the context of a infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot model where only a subset of firms cooperate. We show that, in our model, an increase in the number of cartel firms may increase collusion likelihood by diminishing the negative effects for collusion of the existence of a competitive fringe. Also, we show that an increase in the number of fringe firms makes collusion harder to sustain. |
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