Husserl’s Modal Sense of Evidence: Modality versus Modalization

Phenomenological evidence has been characterized as fulfillment of a meaning intention, comprehension that tends to assimilate evidence to fulfilled consciousness, without making justice to the essential and mutual implication of emptiness and fullness that constitutes it out of its horizontic-inten...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Anton, Ivana
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2013
País:Perú
Institución:Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Repositorio:Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú
Idioma:español
OAI Identifier:oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/7629
Acceso en línea:http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/arete/article/view/7629
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Husserl
evidence
modality
possibility
type
evidencia
modalidad
posibilidad
tipo
Descripción
Sumario:Phenomenological evidence has been characterized as fulfillment of a meaning intention, comprehension that tends to assimilate evidence to fulfilled consciousness, without making justice to the essential and mutual implication of emptiness and fullness that constitutes it out of its horizontic-intentional kind. The horizon, typically configured, offers the field of possible fulfillment; that is why it can be said that evidence takes place in a consciousness of possibility, namely, a modal one, though in an originary material and not doxic or positional sense,because it is the first one that is incumbent upon relationships of fulfillment. Modality that essentially characterizes evidence does not reveal itself then in the possible modalization as positional modification of a unitary content, but in its “outlined” material configuration of fullness and emptiness that gives somethingas something referring to other possibilities as moments of its own validity.