Existence as a Real Predicate in Thomas Aquinas
It is often attributed to Aquinas the thesis that existence, unlike essence, cannot be the object of conceptualization. Arguably, without a concept of existence, Aquinas offers an interpretation of existential propositions which closely resemble the modern analytic analysis. Accordingly, w...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2019 |
| País: | Perú |
| Recursos: | Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú |
| Repositorio: | Revistas - Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/21508 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://revistas.pucp.edu.pe/index.php/revistaira/article/view/21508 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Thomas Aquinas Existence Real predicate Signification theory Medieval semantics Tomás de Aquino Existencia Predicado real Teoría de la significación Semántica medieval |
| Resumo: | It is often attributed to Aquinas the thesis that existence, unlike essence, cannot be the object of conceptualization. Arguably, without a concept of existence, Aquinas offers an interpretation of existential propositions which closely resemble the modern analytic analysis. Accordingly, when wesay ‘P exists’, we attribute no property or special attribute to P. The purpose of this article is to show that for Thomas Aquinas, existence, like essence, can be the object of conceptualization nd functions as a real predicate. To that end, I base myself on Aquinas’ theory of signification. |
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