On The Concept of Constitutional Liquidity
This paper analyses constitutional liquidity clauses (CLCs), as characterized by José María Sauca. On the structural features, firstly, it argues that it is difficult to reconduct the examples of CLCs to a single model, hence, once the distinction between prescriptive and constitutive rules has been...
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | México |
| Recursos: | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho |
| Idioma: | español inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/18652 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/18652 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Constitutional Liquidation Constitutive Rules Sovereignty Constitutional Mutations Evolutive Interpretation Reglas constitutivas Liquidez constitucional Soberanía Mutación constitucional Interpretación evolutiva |
| Resumo: | This paper analyses constitutional liquidity clauses (CLCs), as characterized by José María Sauca. On the structural features, firstly, it argues that it is difficult to reconduct the examples of CLCs to a single model, hence, once the distinction between prescriptive and constitutive rules has been introduced, there are six possible reconstructions. Secondly, it states that the principle of prevalence, far from assuming that there are no contradictions between the rules that may emanate from CLCs and constitutional norms, presupposes them. Thirdly, it argues that maintaining that CLCs imply a transfer of sovereignty can only be due to an ambiguous use of the term “sovereignty”. As far as functions are concerned, and contrary to Sauca’s argument, it shows that CLCs can lead to constitutional mutations and can feasibly be seen as mechanisms of last resort. |
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