Tariff protection and trade agreements
This paper studies the optimal tariff rates on goods imported from the rest of the world when a commercial club accepts a new partner. It shows that when a new member is accepted into the club, the other members of a free trade agreement have incentives to reduce tariffs on the rest of the world...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 1999 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | EL COLEGIO DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx:article/224 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/224 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | tariffs imported goods free trade agreement custom union aranceles bienes importados tratado de libre comercio Unión Aduanera |
| Sumario: | This paper studies the optimal tariff rates on goods imported from the rest of the world when a commercial club accepts a new partner. It shows that when a new member is accepted into the club, the other members of a free trade agreement have incentives to reduce tariffs on the rest of the world's goods. However, when the trade agreement is a custom union, the union may have incentives to increase the common external tariff. This happens when the industry of the custom union is small compared to the world industry. |
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