The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG). A self-directed organization
Many studies on international intergovernmental organizations (IOs) rule out there being autonomous or capable of self-directing their processes of change. The case of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) makes it possible precisely to observe to what degree an IO is au...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2018 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | EL COLEGIO DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Foro Internacional |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.forointernacional.colmex.mx:article/2530 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://forointernacional.colmex.mx/index.php/fi/article/view/2530 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Corruption impunity autonomy self-directed actor rule of law Corrupción impunidad autonomía actor autodirigido Estado de derecho |
| Sumario: | Many studies on international intergovernmental organizations (IOs) rule out there being autonomous or capable of self-directing their processes of change. The case of the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG) makes it possible precisely to observe to what degree an IO is autonomous. Through documentary analysis and interviews with the leadership of the CICIG, this article shows that the organization adjusted and reinterpreted its mandate as the result of a process of internal and autonomous decisions. This evidence contributes to the debate about IOs as self-directed actors. |
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