Parliamentary oversight and fusion between parlamentarism and presidentialism
It is perfectly possible to compare presidentialism and parlamentarism with regard to controls. Without parliamentary oversight representative democracy does not exist. Constitutional norms and Standing Orders already reflect this tendency in Latin America. This conclusion leads us to a different ap...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Cuestiones Constitucionales. Revista Mexicana de Derecho Constitucional |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/11452 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/cuestiones-constitucionales/article/view/11452 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | presidentialism parlamentarism political control oversight presidencialismo parlamentarismo control político |
| Sumario: | It is perfectly possible to compare presidentialism and parlamentarism with regard to controls. Without parliamentary oversight representative democracy does not exist. Constitutional norms and Standing Orders already reflect this tendency in Latin America. This conclusion leads us to a different approach to the classic controversy on both systems of government. The original US presidential system is somewhat outdated and difficult to export. The binomial presidentialism/parlamentarism is nowadays more a continuum with differences in degree. Three tendencies can be detected: European parliamentarism has evolved towards presidential leadership, Latin American presidentialism has incorporated parliamentary tools, and, finally, cross-fertilization among Parliamentary Standing Orders has developed. Extreme multi-party systems, proportional representation, and an absolutist understanding of presidential separation of powers which makes parliamentary oversight impossible are incompatible features. The easiest solution emerges from abandoning that separatist interpretation. The idea that the President should be directly accountable to the electorate and not to the Parliament make difficult mechanisms of political responsibility, but certain devices of oversight could be enough to achieve checks and balances. |
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