Precarious democracies, political negotiation and selective predation
This paper demonstrates that a precarious democracy is harmful to the poor rather than benefiting them as long as the governing party, being a highly informal organization, includes a cartel of political patrons and business people. The mayor is unable to govern freely due to controls or vetoes exer...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | EL COLEGIO DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México |
| Idioma: | inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx:article/30 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/30 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | clientelism poverty political negotiation precarious democracies C72 D31 D33 D63 clientelismo pobreza negociación política democracias precarias |
| Sumario: | This paper demonstrates that a precarious democracy is harmful to the poor rather than benefiting them as long as the governing party, being a highly informal organization, includes a cartel of political patrons and business people. The mayor is unable to govern freely due to controls or vetoes exercised by those collective actors to which he/she belongs. Not having been elected democratically, the objective of these groups is to co-opt the state at the subnational level by violating civil rights and liberties on election days and committing crimes against the public administration during the term of government. |
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