Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?
Many have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order-Representationalist (HOR) theories attempt to explain such self-awareness by means of higher-order representation. Consciou...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México |
| Repositorio: | Redalyc-UNAM |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:redalyc.org:339744130005 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=339744130005 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Filosofía Self Higher awareness Mindreading Consciousness |
| Sumario: | Many have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order-Representationalist (HOR) theories attempt to explain such self-awareness by means of higher-order representation. Consciousness depends on our capacity to represent our own mental states: our Theory of Mind. It is generally agreed that such an ability can be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition. I will argue that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories. |
|---|