A market design approach for workers' selection of the National Electoral Institute of Mexico
In this document we propose a model based in matching games to analyze the problem of workers’ selection by the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. After a revision of the theoretically relevant results, an allocation mechanism is proposed to select the workers. This mechanism improves the exist...
| Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2015 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | EL COLEGIO DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Estudios Económicos de El Colegio de México |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx:article/23 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://estudioseconomicos.colmex.mx/index.php/economicos/article/view/23 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | matching mechanism design C78 D47 Instituto Nacional Electoral administración publica |
| Sumario: | In this document we propose a model based in matching games to analyze the problem of workers’ selection by the National Electoral Institute of Mexico. After a revision of the theoretically relevant results, an allocation mechanism is proposed to select the workers. This mechanism improves the existing procedure. |
|---|