Precedent, Analogy and Reasons for Action. Comments on the Ideas of Frederick Schauer
For a large part of the legal literature, with which I am particularly in agreement, the use and follow-up of judicial decisions in future cases is primarily a matter of analogies. However, the well-known professor Frederick Schauer, in several of his stud-ies and publications, has put this idea at...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/16125 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/16125 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Precedents Analogy Reasons for Action Exclusionary Reasons Conclusive reasons Precedente analogía razones para actuar razones excluyentes razones concluyentes |
| Sumario: | For a large part of the legal literature, with which I am particularly in agreement, the use and follow-up of judicial decisions in future cases is primarily a matter of analogies. However, the well-known professor Frederick Schauer, in several of his stud-ies and publications, has put this idea at risk with good arguments. According to his inter-pretation, following the precedent is something substantially different from analogical reasoning. In this paper, we try to problematize his thesis from four analytical perspec-tives that I consider essentials: principles-rules; communicative intentions-linguistic tool; internal-external reason; and excluding-conclusive reasons. Within them, the thesis of separation proposed by Schauer would seem to fails. |
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