The Transparency of Subnational Debt as a Mechanism to Limit its Growth
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the lack of an explicit transparency obligation in terms of disclosing the amount of subnational public debt and limiting it in relevant legislation, which effectively allow subnational debt to balloon. To analyze this matter, we estimate two econometric model...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2017 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Problemas del Desarrollo. Revista Latinoamericana de Economía |
| Idioma: | español inglés |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/57525 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.probdes.iiec.unam.mx/index.php/pde/article/view/57525 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | deuda subnacional corrupción transparencia finanzas públicas modelos econométricos entidades federativas Subnational debt corruption transparency public finance econometric models states |
| Sumario: | The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the lack of an explicit transparency obligation in terms of disclosing the amount of subnational public debt and limiting it in relevant legislation, which effectively allow subnational debt to balloon. To analyze this matter, we estimate two econometric models that combine panel data and time series to determine the impact of transparency requirements and regulatory constraints on the behavior of state debt. It was found that on average, debt tended to be 28% higher in states where it was not mandatory to disclose debt levels; likewise, it was observed that on average, debt was 43% lower in states with explicit debt limits. |
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