Fiscal Federalism in Mexico: Distortions and Structural Traps
The decentralization process in Mexico has shown significant progress by trying to empower local and state governments. However, the Mexican case makes clear that the transfer of greater powers to subnational governments does not necessarily means an increase in their institutional capacities. Thus,...
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versão publicada |
| Data de publicação: | 2013 |
| País: | México |
| Recursos: | Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas, A.C. |
| Repositório: | Redalyc-CIDE |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:redalyc.org:50428804001 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=50428804001 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Estudios Territoriales local finance Fiscal federalism decentralization policies intergovernmental relations |
| Resumo: | The decentralization process in Mexico has shown significant progress by trying to empower local and state governments. However, the Mexican case makes clear that the transfer of greater powers to subnational governments does not necessarily means an increase in their institutional capacities. Thus, due to the lack of institutional capacities at the subnational level, the prevailing arrangement of fiscal federalism in Mexico has generated vertical imbalances that result in “structural traps”. As a consequence, the current framework fails to guarantee the three basic premises that should be fulfilled by today’s intergovernmental fiscal arrangements: fiscal responsibility, compensatory duties and accountability. This article (1) explores the current state of fiscal federalism in Mexico, (2) makes a comparison with OECD countries to show how levels of government interact in both, federal and unitary regimes and (3)makes an assessment of the institutional capacities of subnational governments in Mexico. |
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