Party system and efficiency of public goods supply: a formal model
Objective: To advance in a theoretical explanation about the effect of party systems and political competition on government performance, relative to the provision of public goods and clientelistc private goods. Methodology: I build and present a theoretical model to address the cited problem. R...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD DE GUADALAJARA |
| Repositorio: | EconoQuantum |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:econoquantum.cucea.udg.mx:article/7170 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://econoquantum.cucea.udg.mx/index.php/EQ/article/view/7170 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Party system, government efficiency, clientelism, public goods provision. Sistema de partidos eficiencia gubernamental clientelismo provisión de bienes públicos |
| Sumario: | Objective: To advance in a theoretical explanation about the effect of party systems and political competition on government performance, relative to the provision of public goods and clientelistc private goods. Methodology: I build and present a theoretical model to address the cited problem. Results: The model describes how the rise in the number of competing political parties encourages the clientelistic behavior of incumbents. Limitations: Despite the paper explains some known empirical facts, it does not present any empirical analysis and evidence. Originality: The paper presents an original formal model based on the government employment to analyze the effect that the party system has over government performance. Conclusion: The main result shows that the increase in the number of parties within the system, diminishes public goods delivers and encourages clientelistic expenditures. Recepción: 10/04/2019 Aceptación: 04/12/2019 |
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