On feedback nash equilibrium and cooperation in the neoclassical growth model
Far away from any ideological point of view, our aim in this paper is to study, in a differential-game-theoretical approach, the standard growth model. Our baseline model comes from Kaitala y Pohjola (2009) based on the original ideas of Lancaster (1973). We focus on the computation of feedback stra...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2012 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí |
| Repositorio: | Redalyc-UASLP |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:redalyc.org:125025375002 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=125025375002 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Economía y Finanzas Nash equilibria Differential games Neoclassical Growth model |
| Sumario: | Far away from any ideological point of view, our aim in this paper is to study, in a differential-game-theoretical approach, the standard growth model. Our baseline model comes from Kaitala y Pohjola (2009) based on the original ideas of Lancaster (1973). We focus on the computation of feedback strategies and we use history-dependent strategies, such as trigger strategies, in which to begin by cooperating and will cooperate as long as the rivals do, and upon observing a defection, it will immediately imply to revert to a period of punishment of specified length in which everyone plays non-cooperatively. We show that trigger strategies are employed by both groups to sustain cooperation as equilibrium. Then, we conclude that players’ memory strategies are the key for attaining the maximum economic growth. |
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