A Model of the Indirect Effect of Crime on the Demand for Money

This paper studies the indirect relation between the demand for money and crime, which emerges from the defensive actions of companies against criminal clients. A theoretical search model is built in which companies trade with criminal clients who consume without paying, allowing the former to hire...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Rodríguez-Reyes, Luis R.
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión publicada
Fecha de publicación:2018
País:México
Institución:Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Occidente
Repositorio:Repositorio Institucional del ITESO
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:rei.iteso.mx:11117/5822
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/11117/5822
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Crime
Private Security
Demand for Money
Market Externality
Indirect Effect
Crimen
Seguridad Privada
Demanda de Dinero
Externalidad de Mercado
Descripción
Sumario:This paper studies the indirect relation between the demand for money and crime, which emerges from the defensive actions of companies against criminal clients. A theoretical search model is built in which companies trade with criminal clients who consume without paying, allowing the former to hire private security. The model produces two balances in pure strategies. First, if the cost of security is high, companies do not hire private security and the criminal buyers do not carry money. Second, if the cost of security is low, the high demand for money is reestablished. This construct is formalized in a purely theoretical model that generates proposals that can be proven empirically, establishing a future line of research. It should be noted that the indirect effect described has not been discussed in relevant literature. As a result, the existence of an indirect channel between crime and money that emerges from a market externality is demonstrated: the demand of companies for private security endogenously determines the demand for money of the economy.