El valor moral de la vergüenza
Presenting a contrast with a Kantian perspective, we argue that shame is an emotion with moral value, and that the study of the moral value of shame helps shape a theory of morality in which notions such as autonomy, guilt and freedom carry less weight than that given to them by the Kantian traditio...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2016 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio Institucional Caxcán |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:http://ricaxcan.uaz.edu.mx:20.500.11845/2374 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://ricaxcan.uaz.edu.mx/jspui/handle/20.500.11845/2374 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | HUMANIDADES Y CIENCIAS DE LA CONDUCTA [4] vergüenza valor moral Hume Kant emoción |
| Sumario: | Presenting a contrast with a Kantian perspective, we argue that shame is an emotion with moral value, and that the study of the moral value of shame helps shape a theory of morality in which notions such as autonomy, guilt and freedom carry less weight than that given to them by the Kantian tradition. We think that the point of view of others is also constitutive of personal identity. Moral agents are socially-constructed, and the moral value of their identity, actions and thoughts is inseparable from the social practices in which they participate. This idea seems to us fundamental to understanding the identity of a moral agent. In this vein, our defense of the moral value of shame– and of an ethics consistent with it– comes closer to the ideas of Hume and Bernard Williams on these same themes. |
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