Consent and the Fallacy of Necessity: a Replay to Beyleveld and Brownsword
In their influential work Consent in the Law, Beyleveld and Brownsword have raised a word of caution against the “fallacy of necessity”, which is the claim made on the assumption that seeking consent is always necessary to justify an act, arrangement or measure that may have an impact on another per...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoría del Derecho |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/16127 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.juridicas.unam.mx/index.php/filosofia-derecho/article/view/16127 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Consent Fallacy of Necessity Justification Autonomy Self-Respect Personal Reasons Consentimiento falacia de la necesidad justificación autonomía (auto)respeto razones personales |
| Sumario: | In their influential work Consent in the Law, Beyleveld and Brownsword have raised a word of caution against the “fallacy of necessity”, which is the claim made on the assumption that seeking consent is always necessary to justify an act, arrangement or measure that may have an impact on another person. The aim of this paper is to criti-cally analyze the alleged fallacy, in order to determine whether the need to seek other people’s consent is greater or lesser than the one envisioned by these authors. |
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