The Banality of Injustice
This paper aims to read structural injustices through the notion of banality that Hannah Arendt used to qualify evil when she studied Eichmann's behavior during the trial in Jerusalem in 1961. For this purpose, we propose a dialogue between Arendt, Judith Shklar, and Iris Marion Young. The arti...
| Autores: | , |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO Y DE ESTUDIOS SUPERIORES DE MONTERREY |
| Repositorio: | En-claves del pensamiento |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.enclavesdelpensamiento.mx:article/545 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.enclavesdelpensamiento.mx/index.php/enclaves/article/view/545 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Arendt Shklar Young injusticia estructural mal banalidad Structural Injustice Evil Banality |
| Sumario: | This paper aims to read structural injustices through the notion of banality that Hannah Arendt used to qualify evil when she studied Eichmann's behavior during the trial in Jerusalem in 1961. For this purpose, we propose a dialogue between Arendt, Judith Shklar, and Iris Marion Young. The article is divided into three sections. In the first section, we briefly review the treatment of the question of evil in Western monotheistic philosophy, to which Arendt, Shklar, and Young are certainly heiresses, and of injustice according to the latter two authors. In the second one, we propose an analysis of structural injustice in terms of banality, illuminating Arendt's work with that of Young and Shklar and vice versa, with particular emphasis on Young's study of Arendt. Finally, in the last section, we argue that the conceptualization of injustice as both banal and structural allows us to perceive more clearly the political dimension of our responsibility for it and to stress that this responsibility has a double individual and collective belonging. |
|---|