Friends forever? Ruptures in the PRI and their effect on social spending during electoral authoritarianism in Mexico (1988-2000)
Partisan defections in electoral authoritarianism have been shown to generate instability for the regime. The reaction of autocrats has also been analyzed. It may be expected that they begin by repressing the “traitors.” However, I argue that there is a less risky strategy to resolve the threat of p...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | EL COLEGIO DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Foro Internacional |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:oai.forointernacional.colmex.mx:article/2884 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://forointernacional.colmex.mx/index.php/fi/article/view/2884 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | rupturas partidistas gasto social México autoritarismo electoral PRI party ruptures social spending Mexico electoral authoritarianism |
| Sumario: | Partisan defections in electoral authoritarianism have been shown to generate instability for the regime. The reaction of autocrats has also been analyzed. It may be expected that they begin by repressing the “traitors.” However, I argue that there is a less risky strategy to resolve the threat of party ruptures. I hold that autocrats can appeal to the masses through increases in social spending and thereby avoid them being coopted by the defectors. I examine this argument using models for panel data and evidence from the authoritarian period in Mexico at state level. |
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