Transparency, litigation and economic rationality
Excessive litigation appears to be one of the main concerns of judiciary actors. The economic theory of law holds that the asymmetries in the information between potential litigants creates incentives for going to trial over arrengment. On the other side, some scholars hold that the legal opacity ─e...
| Autor: | |
|---|---|
| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2012 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Revista de la Facultad de Derecho de México |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/30368 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rfdm/article/view/30368 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Transparency Litigation Economics Law Judicial Branch Transparencia litigiosidad Economía Derecho Poder Judicial |
| Sumario: | Excessive litigation appears to be one of the main concerns of judiciary actors. The economic theory of law holds that the asymmetries in the information between potential litigants creates incentives for going to trial over arrengment. On the other side, some scholars hold that the legal opacity ─especially when it comes from the judiciary─ deter potential litigants to use Courts. Therefore, a transparency policy in the Judiciary may have opposite effects: from one hand, it may create incentives for arrangments since the potencial litigants have small infomartional problems. From the other hand, transparency increase trust in the Judiciary, so people would be willing to use Courts as a mean to solve their disputes. This article seeks to answer, which effect is more important from a juridical and economic approach. |
|---|