Revisiting the hallucination argument
The so-called “hallucination argument” has been traditionally used to justify or reinforce skeptical positions in epistemology, and delimit perception theories conceptually –thus becoming a basic concern in the theory of knowledge. In this paper I will defend the idea that such an argument has been...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2010 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Acta Comportamentalia |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/14607 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/acom/article/view/14607 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Hallucination argument skepticism epistemology empiricism phenomenology. argumento de la alucinación escepticismo epistemología empirismo fenomenología. |
| Sumario: | The so-called “hallucination argument” has been traditionally used to justify or reinforce skeptical positions in epistemology, and delimit perception theories conceptually –thus becoming a basic concern in the theory of knowledge. In this paper I will defend the idea that such an argument has been overestimated and that, in its classical formulation, it is neither compatible with empirical arguments nor does it withstand a detailed phenomenological scrutiny. Based on naturalistic and phenomenological considerations, I will present several reasons that discredit the argument and force us to reconsider it in a different light, which has some important consequences for the theory of knowledge. |
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