El PRI ante la crisis electoral de julio de 2006: ¿lealtad institucional, traición o realpolitik?
On the presidential election held in July 2, 2006, the Institutional Revolutionary Party was set back to third place and a political crisis blowed up. The equilibrium of the PRIs internal currents was modified by the electoral results. On that context, the PRI leadership and PRI governors had to fa...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2011 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO |
| Repositorio: | Estudios Políticos |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/23851 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.revistas.unam.mx/index.php/rep/article/view/23851 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | PRI realpolitik relationship of forces PRI governors political crisis realpolitik priísta relación de fuerzas gobernadores priistas crisis política |
| Sumario: | On the presidential election held in July 2, 2006, the Institutional Revolutionary Party was set back to third place and a political crisis blowed up. The equilibrium of the PRIs internal currents was modified by the electoral results. On that context, the PRI leadership and PRI governors had to face several problems. One was how to react to the political crisis that blew up in July 2 and what roll should the PRI play in that conflict. Another problem concerned the election of the new deputies and senators leaders in both legislative chambers. Both problems were hard to solve in the complex internal party context, whose main feature was the existence of three different nucleus of PRI governors who were fighting over the control of the political agenda and the distribution of party positions. |
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