A NEW ESSAY ABOUT LYING: A RESPONSE TO ALEXANDRE KOYRÉ
There is a tendency to assume that, under certain circumstances, lying is morally justifiable. There are numerous logical and philosophical arguments, which claim to have objective validity, point out that a world where only truth exists would be unbearable. This brings, as a necessary consequence,...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2013 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Querétaro |
| Repositorio: | Redalyc-UAQ |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:redalyc.org:421639455005 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=421639455005 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Filosofía Ethics Pragmatism Truth and Lies Alexandre Koyré Radical Honesty |
| Sumario: | There is a tendency to assume that, under certain circumstances, lying is morally justifiable. There are numerous logical and philosophical arguments, which claim to have objective validity, point out that a world where only truth exists would be unbearable. This brings, as a necessary consequence, the relativization of the importance of truth and its function of being the pillar mode of the moral principle of honesty, turning truthful discourse into a tool, as usable as lying for pragmatic matters that are sometimes disguised as moral. Frankly in disagreement with such positions, this essay aims to present a detailed counter argument, claiming that lying is always immoral. |
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