Comparative analysis of optimal conditional transfers in a fiscally centralized federation
The international evidence shows that the spending of sub-national governments depends on unconditional transfers from the central government. This evidence makes relevant the following question: What is the optimal design of inter-governmental transfers? In this article we provide an answer to this...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2021 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:uacj.mx:oai:oai:erevistas.uacj.mx:article-253 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://erevistas.uacj.mx/ojs/index.php/noesis/article/view/253 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Fiscal federalism intergovernmental transfers tradeoff between efficiency and equity Federalismo fiscal transferencias intergubernamentales intercambio entre eficiencia y equidad CIENCIAS SOCIALES info:eu-repo/classification/cti/5 |
| Sumario: | The international evidence shows that the spending of sub-national governments depends on unconditional transfers from the central government. This evidence makes relevant the following question: What is the optimal design of inter-governmental transfers? In this article we provide an answer to this question. The main contribution of this article is the characterization of optimal unconditional intergovernmental transfers. We also contribute to the literature, by providing empirically verifiable hypotheses on how the federal transfers from the central government depend on the interregional inequality of income, the distribution and magnitude of interregional spillovers of sub-national expenditures, and the deadweight labor costs associated with taxation and intergovernmental transfers. |
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