Do competitive elections produce better-quality governments?: Evidence from Mexican municipalities, 1990-2000
Electoral theories of governmental accountability assume that competitive elections produce responsive governments because they allow voters to punish or reward the performance of incumbent politicians at the ballot box. This research note investigates whether the increasing competitiveness of munic...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2007 |
| País: | México |
| Institución: | Instituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Occidente |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio Institucional del ITESO |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:rei.iteso.mx:11117/9609 |
| Acceso en línea: | https://hdl.handle.net/11117/9609 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Competencia Electoral Gobiernos Subnacionales Políticas Públicas |
| Sumario: | Electoral theories of governmental accountability assume that competitive elections produce responsive governments because they allow voters to punish or reward the performance of incumbent politicians at the ballot box. This research note investigates whether the increasing competitiveness of municipal elections in Mexico during the 1990s has improved the performance of local governments by focusing on the provision of potable water and drainage. The empirical evidence does not seem to support the electoral accountability hypothesis, but rather suggests that municipal governments are more responsive to the influence of socioeconomic modernity, as well as to the direct pressure of politically mobilized citizens. The findings cast doubts on the idea that competitive elections, by themselves, will significantly improve the quality of local governments in the country. |
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