Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems

In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal (respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-val...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Van den Brink, René, Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva), Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2021
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/179058
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/179058
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Economia matemàtica
Mercat financer
Equilibri (Economia)
Mathematical economics
Financial market
Equilibrium (Economics)
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spelling Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problemsVan den Brink, RenéNúñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)Robles Jiménez, Francisco JavierEconomia matemàticaMercat financerEquilibri (Economia)Mathematical economicsFinancial marketEquilibrium (Economics)In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal (respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-valuation antimonotonicity (respectively buyer-valuation monotonicity). Essential in these properties is that, after a change in valuations, monotonicity is required only for buyers that stay matched with the same seller. Using Owen's derived consistency, the two optimal rules are characterized among all allocation rules for two-sided assignment markets with a variable population, without explicitly requiring stability.Elsevier2021202420212021info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion27 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/179058Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105277Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 195, num. 105277, p. 1-27https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105277cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2021https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/1790582026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
title Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
spellingShingle Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
Van den Brink, René
Economia matemàtica
Mercat financer
Equilibri (Economia)
Mathematical economics
Financial market
Equilibrium (Economics)
title_short Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
title_full Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
title_fullStr Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
title_full_unstemmed Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
title_sort Valuation monotonicity, fairness and stability in assignment problems
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Van den Brink, René
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
author Van den Brink, René
author_facet Van den Brink, René
Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
author_role author
author2 Núñez, Marina (Núñez Oliva)
Robles Jiménez, Francisco Javier
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Economia matemàtica
Mercat financer
Equilibri (Economia)
Mathematical economics
Financial market
Equilibrium (Economics)
topic Economia matemàtica
Mercat financer
Equilibri (Economia)
Mathematical economics
Financial market
Equilibrium (Economics)
description In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal (respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-valuation antimonotonicity (respectively buyer-valuation monotonicity). Essential in these properties is that, after a change in valuations, monotonicity is required only for buyers that stay matched with the same seller. Using Owen's derived consistency, the two optimal rules are characterized among all allocation rules for two-sided assignment markets with a variable population, without explicitly requiring stability.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021
2021
2021
2024
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/179058
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/179058
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105277
Journal of Economic Theory, 2021, vol. 195, num. 105277, p. 1-27
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105277
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2021
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv cc-by-nc-nd (c) Elsevier, 2021
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 27 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.812455

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