Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment

Both quality differentiation and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition. However, their joint influence on the outcome of price competition has not yet been assessed. In this article, we consider a three-stage game in which firms choose quality, then commit to capacity and, f...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Boccard, Nicolas, Wauthy, Xavier
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2010
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:10256/24770
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10256/24770
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Competència econòmica
Preus
Competition
Pricing
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spelling Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity PrecommitmentBoccard, NicolasWauthy, XavierCompetència econòmicaPreusCompetitionPricingBoth quality differentiation and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition. However, their joint influence on the outcome of price competition has not yet been assessed. In this article, we consider a three-stage game in which firms choose quality, then commit to capacity and, finally, compete in price. When the cost of quality is negligible, we show that firms do not differentiate their products in a subgame perfect equilibrium, in other words, capacity precommitment completely eliminates the incentive to differentiate by qualityElsevier2010info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersionpeer-reviewed10 p.application/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10256/24770© International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2010, vol. 28, núm. 3, p. 288-297Articles publicats (D-EC)Boccard, Nicolas Wauthy, Xavier 2010 Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment International Journal of Industrial Organization 28 3 288 297reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)Inglésinfo:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.09.005info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0167-7187info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/eissn/1873-7986Reconeixement-NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 4.0 Internacionalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:10256/247702026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment
title Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment
spellingShingle Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment
Boccard, Nicolas
Competència econòmica
Preus
Competition
Pricing
title_short Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment
title_full Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment
title_fullStr Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment
title_full_unstemmed Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment
title_sort Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Boccard, Nicolas
Wauthy, Xavier
author Boccard, Nicolas
author_facet Boccard, Nicolas
Wauthy, Xavier
author_role author
author2 Wauthy, Xavier
author2_role author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Competència econòmica
Preus
Competition
Pricing
topic Competència econòmica
Preus
Competition
Pricing
description Both quality differentiation and capacity commitment have been shown to relax price competition. However, their joint influence on the outcome of price competition has not yet been assessed. In this article, we consider a three-stage game in which firms choose quality, then commit to capacity and, finally, compete in price. When the cost of quality is negligible, we show that firms do not differentiate their products in a subgame perfect equilibrium, in other words, capacity precommitment completely eliminates the incentive to differentiate by quality
publishDate 2010
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2010
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
peer-reviewed
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10256/24770
url http://hdl.handle.net/10256/24770
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2009.09.005
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0167-7187
info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/eissn/1873-7986
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Reconeixement-NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Reconeixement-NoComercial-SenseObraDerivada 4.0 Internacional
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 10 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Elsevier
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv © International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2010, vol. 28, núm. 3, p. 288-297
Articles publicats (D-EC)
Boccard, Nicolas Wauthy, Xavier 2010 Equilibrium Vertical Differentiation in a Bertrand Model with Capacity Precommitment International Journal of Industrial Organization 28 3 288 297
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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