Tax incentives and noncompliance: Evidence from Swedish micro data

Using rich Swedish administrative panel data, we are able to observe and analyze a specific type of tax noncompliance, namely, overstatement of a self-reported dividend allowance that can reduce shareholders’ tax liability. Some 3 percent of Swedish owner managers overstate this allowance during the...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Alstadsæter, A. (Annette)|||/items/c8171f4c-2883-431b-bcb7-bd0b8340b225, Jacob, M. (Martin)|||/items/b4c80971-c877-4230-904c-54573540e482
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Navarra
Repositorio:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/119802
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10171/119802
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Tax evasion
Tax compliance
Self-reporting
Tax incentive
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spelling Tax incentives and noncompliance: Evidence from Swedish micro dataAlstadsæter, A. (Annette)|||/items/c8171f4c-2883-431b-bcb7-bd0b8340b225Jacob, M. (Martin)|||/items/b4c80971-c877-4230-904c-54573540e482Tax evasionTax complianceSelf-reportingTax incentiveUsing rich Swedish administrative panel data, we are able to observe and analyze a specific type of tax noncompliance, namely, overstatement of a self-reported dividend allowance that can reduce shareholders’ tax liability. Some 3 percent of Swedish owner managers overstate this allowance during the period 2006 to 2009. Exploiting a large kink in the income tax schedule, we identify a positive and significant effect of the income tax rate on noncompliance. The estimated elasticity of noncompliance with respect to the marginal tax rate ranges from .5 to .7, depending on the specification.SageDadun. Depósito Académico Digital Universidad de Navarra20162016-10-1920162016-10-19journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/119802reponame:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarrainstname:Universidad de NavarraInglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/1198022026-06-21T12:47:57Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Tax incentives and noncompliance: Evidence from Swedish micro data
title Tax incentives and noncompliance: Evidence from Swedish micro data
spellingShingle Tax incentives and noncompliance: Evidence from Swedish micro data
Alstadsæter, A. (Annette)|||/items/c8171f4c-2883-431b-bcb7-bd0b8340b225
Tax evasion
Tax compliance
Self-reporting
Tax incentive
title_short Tax incentives and noncompliance: Evidence from Swedish micro data
title_full Tax incentives and noncompliance: Evidence from Swedish micro data
title_fullStr Tax incentives and noncompliance: Evidence from Swedish micro data
title_full_unstemmed Tax incentives and noncompliance: Evidence from Swedish micro data
title_sort Tax incentives and noncompliance: Evidence from Swedish micro data
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Alstadsæter, A. (Annette)|||/items/c8171f4c-2883-431b-bcb7-bd0b8340b225
Jacob, M. (Martin)|||/items/b4c80971-c877-4230-904c-54573540e482
author Alstadsæter, A. (Annette)|||/items/c8171f4c-2883-431b-bcb7-bd0b8340b225
author_facet Alstadsæter, A. (Annette)|||/items/c8171f4c-2883-431b-bcb7-bd0b8340b225
Jacob, M. (Martin)|||/items/b4c80971-c877-4230-904c-54573540e482
author_role author
author2 Jacob, M. (Martin)|||/items/b4c80971-c877-4230-904c-54573540e482
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital Universidad de Navarra
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Tax evasion
Tax compliance
Self-reporting
Tax incentive
topic Tax evasion
Tax compliance
Self-reporting
Tax incentive
description Using rich Swedish administrative panel data, we are able to observe and analyze a specific type of tax noncompliance, namely, overstatement of a self-reported dividend allowance that can reduce shareholders’ tax liability. Some 3 percent of Swedish owner managers overstate this allowance during the period 2006 to 2009. Exploiting a large kink in the income tax schedule, we identify a positive and significant effect of the income tax rate on noncompliance. The estimated elasticity of noncompliance with respect to the marginal tax rate ranges from .5 to .7, depending on the specification.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016
2016-10-19
2016
2016-10-19
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv journal article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10171/119802
url https://hdl.handle.net/10171/119802
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Sage
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Sage
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
instname:Universidad de Navarra
instname_str Universidad de Navarra
reponame_str Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
collection Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.812429

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