The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations

Firms lobby public institutions even when associations they are members of are lobbying those same institutions. This is what we conceptualise as ‘parallel lobbying’. Firms engage in parallel lobbying to monitor associations they are members of, reinforce the message delivered by the associations, p...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Albareda, Adrià, Coen, David, Saz-Carranza, Angel
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2025
País:España
Institución:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:20.500.14342/5903
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/5903
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2534653
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Lobbying
Firms
Business associations
European Union
id ES_fcc8e5591bccc4d80985d98a9f74ea78
oai_identifier_str oai:recercat.cat:20.500.14342/5903
network_acronym_str ES
network_name_str España
repository_id_str
spelling The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associationsAlbareda, AdriàCoen, DavidSaz-Carranza, AngelLobbyingFirmsBusiness associationsEuropean UnionFirms lobby public institutions even when associations they are members of are lobbying those same institutions. This is what we conceptualise as ‘parallel lobbying’. Firms engage in parallel lobbying to monitor associations they are members of, reinforce the message delivered by the associations, provide additional or nuanced information that goes beyond the lowest common denominator, or even to break ranks from the collective position and signal a different message to the one provided by the association. Regardless of what the rationale behind these parallel meetings is, this article intends to bring new light into this phenomenon by examining the extent to which parallel lobbying occurs at the EU level and, more importantly, unveiling what firm – and association-level characteristics explain why firms exercise parallel lobbying. We rely on large-n dataset of meetings held by companies, associations, and EU public officials between 2014 and 2023. Our findings partially confirm that firm characteristics relate to parallel lobbying. Yet, the occurrence of parallel meetings seems to be mostly driven by association-level features. This study provides new insights into an under-examined phenomenon that affects the quality and legitimacy of our governance systems.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionInforma UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis GroupUniversitat Ramon Llull. Esade2025info:eu-repo/semantics/article24 p.https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/5903https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2534653reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésJournal of European Public Policy© L'autor/aAttribution 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:20.500.14342/59032026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
title The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
spellingShingle The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
Albareda, Adrià
Lobbying
Firms
Business associations
European Union
title_short The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
title_full The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
title_fullStr The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
title_full_unstemmed The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
title_sort The firm logic of parallel lobbying: explaining why corporations lobby directly in addition to their associations
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Albareda, Adrià
Coen, David
Saz-Carranza, Angel
author Albareda, Adrià
author_facet Albareda, Adrià
Coen, David
Saz-Carranza, Angel
author_role author
author2 Coen, David
Saz-Carranza, Angel
author2_role author
author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Universitat Ramon Llull. Esade
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Lobbying
Firms
Business associations
European Union
topic Lobbying
Firms
Business associations
European Union
description Firms lobby public institutions even when associations they are members of are lobbying those same institutions. This is what we conceptualise as ‘parallel lobbying’. Firms engage in parallel lobbying to monitor associations they are members of, reinforce the message delivered by the associations, provide additional or nuanced information that goes beyond the lowest common denominator, or even to break ranks from the collective position and signal a different message to the one provided by the association. Regardless of what the rationale behind these parallel meetings is, this article intends to bring new light into this phenomenon by examining the extent to which parallel lobbying occurs at the EU level and, more importantly, unveiling what firm – and association-level characteristics explain why firms exercise parallel lobbying. We rely on large-n dataset of meetings held by companies, associations, and EU public officials between 2014 and 2023. Our findings partially confirm that firm characteristics relate to parallel lobbying. Yet, the occurrence of parallel meetings seems to be mostly driven by association-level features. This study provides new insights into an under-examined phenomenon that affects the quality and legitimacy of our governance systems.
publishDate 2025
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/5903
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2534653
url https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14342/5903
https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2025.2534653
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Journal of European Public Policy
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv © L'autor/a
Attribution 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv © L'autor/a
Attribution 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 24 p.
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
_version_ 1869425480890843136
score 15.812429

Similares en LA Referencia