On the externality free shapley-shubik index
We address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017). On the one hand, we provide bounds for any efficient, symmetric, and monotonic power index. On the other hand, we characterize the restriction of t...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Data de publicação: | 2017 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya) |
| Repositório: | Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:recercat.cat:2445/115651 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/115651 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Teoria de jocs Economia matemàtica Jocs cooperatius (Matemàtica) Game theory Mathematical economics Cooperative games (Mathematics) |
| Resumo: | We address the problem of extending the Shapley-Shubik index to the class of simple games with externalities introduced in Alonso-Meijide et al. (2017). On the one hand, we provide bounds for any efficient, symmetric, and monotonic power index. On the other hand, we characterize the restriction of the externality-free value of de Clippel and Serrano (2008) to the class of games under study by adapting well-known properties. |
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