Visual experience: rich but impenetrable
According to so-called 'thin' views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called 'rich' views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine...
| Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | article |
| Status: | Versión aceptada para publicación |
| Publication Date: | 2018 |
| Country: | España |
| Institution: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repository: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/106208 |
| Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/106208 |
| Access Level: | Open access |
| Keyword: | Filosofia de l'art Philosophy of the art |
| Summary: | According to so-called 'thin' views about the content of experience, we can only visually experience low-level features such as colour, shape, texture or motion. According to so-called 'rich' views, we can also visually experience some high-level properties, such as being a pine tree or being threatening. One of the standard objections against rich views is that high-level properties can only be represented at the level of judgment. In this paper, I first challenge this objection by relying on some recent studies in social vision. Secondly, I tackle a different but related issue, namely, the idea that, if the content of experience is rich, then perception is cognitively penetrable. Against this thesis, I argue that the very same criteria that help us vindicate the truly sensory nature of our rich experiences speak against their being cognitively penetrable. |
|---|