The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions

[EN]The Lazarillo of Tormes' picaresque novel introduces a story where two subjects sequentially extract (one, two or three) tokens from a common pool in an asymmetric information framework (the first player cannot observe her partners' actions). By introducing a reward for both subjects i...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Lacomba, Juan Antonio, Lagos, Francisco, Perote Peña, Javier
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Salamanca (USAL)
Repositorio:GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca
OAI Identifier:oai:gredos.usal.es:10366/137465
Acceso en línea:http://hdl.handle.net/10366/137465
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Public-goods game
Econometrics
Ultimatum games
Dilemmas
Cooperation
Information
Coordination
Payoffs
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spelling The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditionsLacomba, Juan AntonioLagos, FranciscoPerote Peña, JavierPublic-goods gameEconometricsUltimatum gamesDilemmasCooperationInformationCoordinationPayoffs[EN]The Lazarillo of Tormes' picaresque novel introduces a story where two subjects sequentially extract (one, two or three) tokens from a common pool in an asymmetric information framework (the first player cannot observe her partners' actions). By introducing a reward for both subjects in case that in every period at least one subject had taken one single token, we define an interesting coordination game. We conduct an experiment with 120 undergraduate students to study their behavior in this framework. We find that if the second player is allowed to take more tokens than her partner, then the frequency of cooperators does not seem to be affected by the informational asymmetry. Nevertheless, this asymmetry (i) incentives the second player to use her 'power of extraction' while the social externality is still available, (ii) yields to more asymmetric profit distributions when subjects win the social externality and (iii) delays the breach period in case of coordination failure. Furthermore, the first choice of the first player is determinant for getting the reward.Public Library of Science (New York)201820182017info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttp://hdl.handle.net/10366/137465reponame:GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamancainstname:Universidad de Salamanca (USAL)InglésAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 Internationalhttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:gredos.usal.es:10366/1374652026-06-07T06:28:51Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions
title The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions
spellingShingle The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions
Lacomba, Juan Antonio
Public-goods game
Econometrics
Ultimatum games
Dilemmas
Cooperation
Information
Coordination
Payoffs
title_short The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions
title_full The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions
title_fullStr The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions
title_full_unstemmed The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions
title_sort The Lazarillo’s game: Sharing resources with asymmetric conditions
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Lacomba, Juan Antonio
Lagos, Francisco
Perote Peña, Javier
author Lacomba, Juan Antonio
author_facet Lacomba, Juan Antonio
Lagos, Francisco
Perote Peña, Javier
author_role author
author2 Lagos, Francisco
Perote Peña, Javier
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Public-goods game
Econometrics
Ultimatum games
Dilemmas
Cooperation
Information
Coordination
Payoffs
topic Public-goods game
Econometrics
Ultimatum games
Dilemmas
Cooperation
Information
Coordination
Payoffs
description [EN]The Lazarillo of Tormes' picaresque novel introduces a story where two subjects sequentially extract (one, two or three) tokens from a common pool in an asymmetric information framework (the first player cannot observe her partners' actions). By introducing a reward for both subjects in case that in every period at least one subject had taken one single token, we define an interesting coordination game. We conduct an experiment with 120 undergraduate students to study their behavior in this framework. We find that if the second player is allowed to take more tokens than her partner, then the frequency of cooperators does not seem to be affected by the informational asymmetry. Nevertheless, this asymmetry (i) incentives the second player to use her 'power of extraction' while the social externality is still available, (ii) yields to more asymmetric profit distributions when subjects win the social externality and (iii) delays the breach period in case of coordination failure. Furthermore, the first choice of the first player is determinant for getting the reward.
publishDate 2017
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2017
2018
2018
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10366/137465
url http://hdl.handle.net/10366/137465
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 International
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Public Library of Science (New York)
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Public Library of Science (New York)
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca
instname:Universidad de Salamanca (USAL)
instname_str Universidad de Salamanca (USAL)
reponame_str GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca
collection GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15,301603

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