Parties getting impatient: Time out of office and portfolio allocation in coalition governments
This article argues that long periods out of office make parties impatient and more willing to make concessions over portfolio allocation in exchange for participation in a coalition cabinet. Two hypotheses are analysed: on the one hand, being in opposition for a long time should put parties at a di...
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Estado: | Versão publicada |
| Data de publicação: | 2012 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universidad de Barcelona |
| Repositório: | Dipòsit Digital de la UB |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:diposit.ub.edu:2445/165099 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/2445/165099 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Governs de coalició Gestió de cartera Coalition governments Portfolio management |
| Resumo: | This article argues that long periods out of office make parties impatient and more willing to make concessions over portfolio allocation in exchange for participation in a coalition cabinet. Two hypotheses are analysed: on the one hand, being in opposition for a long time should put parties at a disadvantage when bargaining over office payoffs. On the other, this effect should not apply to the formateur party, since formation offers are based on the receivers' impatience. The empirical results largely support these expectations. Additional evidence of the causality of the main effect is obtained through the use of matching techniques based on the propensity score. |
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