Defining and Operationalising Defiant Non-Compliance in the EU: The Rule of Law Case
Existing literature often attributes non-compliance to either a lack of resources or implementation costs. However, the rule of law crises in Hungary and Poland present a different picture: a deliberate strategy aimed at not complying with EU enforcement actions. This article differentiates this mod...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2024 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC) |
| Repositorio: | DIGITAL.CSIC. Repositorio Institucional del CSIC |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:digital.csic.es:10261/375661 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10261/375661 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Defiance Hungary Non-compliance Poland Rule of law International politics |
| Sumario: | Existing literature often attributes non-compliance to either a lack of resources or implementation costs. However, the rule of law crises in Hungary and Poland present a different picture: a deliberate strategy aimed at not complying with EU enforcement actions. This article differentiates this model from previous ones and terms it ‘defiant non-compliance’, which is characterised by four types of domestic actions (ignoring the Commission's recommendations and warnings; not complying with Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) rulings; questioning the role of the CJEU as the sole final interpreter of EU law; and impeding national courts' right to raise preliminary questions). A defiant rhetoric questioning the authority and legitimacy of the enforcing authorities accompanies these actions. The article distils defiant non-compliance by systematising empirical evidence on these governments' reactions to EU enforcement. This model of non-compliance severely threatens the foundations of the EU, as it erodes the notion of a community of law-abiding member states' governments. |
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