The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation Debate

The article focuses on acurrent debate in contemporary ethics between socalled situationists and the advocates of virtue ethics. The fundamental assumption made by virtue ethics is that developing and perfecting one’s moral character or moral virtues warrants one’s morally good action. Situationists...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Szutta, N. (Natasza)|||/items/a69ed430-9a65-48d2-a958-e1fd19bc5694
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2021
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Navarra
Repositorio:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/62563
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10171/62563
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:virtue
virtue ethics
situation
moral character
situationist objection
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spelling The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation DebateSzutta, N. (Natasza)|||/items/a69ed430-9a65-48d2-a958-e1fd19bc5694virtuevirtue ethicssituationmoral charactersituationist objectionThe article focuses on acurrent debate in contemporary ethics between socalled situationists and the advocates of virtue ethics. The fundamental assumption made by virtue ethics is that developing and perfecting one’s moral character or moral virtues warrants one’s morally good action. Situationists claim that this assumption contradicts the results of the latest empirical studies. From this observation they conclude that virtue ethics is based on an empirically inadequate moral psychology. In the first part of the article, Ipresent the conceptions of virtue and moral character developed in response to the situationist critique. Ishow to which degree these conceptions differ from the classical, socalled global approach in virtue ethics. In the second part, based on the latest empirical studies in social and cognitive psychology, Iargue, against the situationist objection, that the classical notion of virtue meets the requirement of empirical adequacy. Imainly resort to the interactionist theory of personality by W. Mischel, R. Baumeister’s studies over selfcontrol, D. Kahneman’s dualprocessing theory of the mind, and the studies over automatized processes by J. Bargh.Uniwersytet Mikołaja KopernikaDadun. Depósito Académico Digital Universidad de Navarra20212021-11-1520212021-01-0120212021-01-01journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/10171/62563reponame:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarrainstname:Universidad de NavarraInglésengopen accesshttp://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/625632026-06-21T12:47:57Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation Debate
title The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation Debate
spellingShingle The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation Debate
Szutta, N. (Natasza)|||/items/a69ed430-9a65-48d2-a958-e1fd19bc5694
virtue
virtue ethics
situation
moral character
situationist objection
title_short The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation Debate
title_full The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation Debate
title_fullStr The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation Debate
title_full_unstemmed The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation Debate
title_sort The Concept of Virtue after the Character-Situation Debate
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Szutta, N. (Natasza)|||/items/a69ed430-9a65-48d2-a958-e1fd19bc5694
author Szutta, N. (Natasza)|||/items/a69ed430-9a65-48d2-a958-e1fd19bc5694
author_facet Szutta, N. (Natasza)|||/items/a69ed430-9a65-48d2-a958-e1fd19bc5694
author_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital Universidad de Navarra
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv virtue
virtue ethics
situation
moral character
situationist objection
topic virtue
virtue ethics
situation
moral character
situationist objection
description The article focuses on acurrent debate in contemporary ethics between socalled situationists and the advocates of virtue ethics. The fundamental assumption made by virtue ethics is that developing and perfecting one’s moral character or moral virtues warrants one’s morally good action. Situationists claim that this assumption contradicts the results of the latest empirical studies. From this observation they conclude that virtue ethics is based on an empirically inadequate moral psychology. In the first part of the article, Ipresent the conceptions of virtue and moral character developed in response to the situationist critique. Ishow to which degree these conceptions differ from the classical, socalled global approach in virtue ethics. In the second part, based on the latest empirical studies in social and cognitive psychology, Iargue, against the situationist objection, that the classical notion of virtue meets the requirement of empirical adequacy. Imainly resort to the interactionist theory of personality by W. Mischel, R. Baumeister’s studies over selfcontrol, D. Kahneman’s dualprocessing theory of the mind, and the studies over automatized processes by J. Bargh.
publishDate 2021
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021
2021-11-15
2021
2021-01-01
2021
2021-01-01
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv journal article
http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_6501
dc.type.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/10171/62563
url https://hdl.handle.net/10171/62563
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
eng
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
language eng
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
dc.rights.openaire.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv open access
http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_abf2
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Uniwersytet Mikołaja Kopernika
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
instname:Universidad de Navarra
instname_str Universidad de Navarra
reponame_str Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
collection Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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