Consejeros dominicales minoritarios y buen gobierno corporativo
The capital companies law allows the appointment of constituency directors tothe board without the concurrence of the majorityas amechanism to empower minority shareholders.The proportional representation system (art. 243 LSC) intendsto give voice to minority shareholders, in line with the most inno...
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2022 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad Autónoma de Madrid |
| Repositorio: | Biblos-e Archivo. Repositorio Institucional de la UAM |
| Idioma: | español |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositorio.uam.es:10486/706084 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10486/706084 https://dx.doi.org/10.31009/InDret.2022.i1.11 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | Consejeros minoritarios Sistema de representación proporcional Conflicto permanente Derecho |
| Sumario: | The capital companies law allows the appointment of constituency directors tothe board without the concurrence of the majorityas amechanism to empower minority shareholders.The proportional representation system (art. 243 LSC) intendsto give voice to minority shareholders, in line with the most innovative trends in corporate governance and shareholder activism. The presence of minority directors on the board raisesissues of interestfor our Law. First, the fittingof directors appointed by minority or controlling shareholders in the legal status of directorship. Because directors are naturally dependent on the shareholder who appoints them, they suffer from a conflict of loyalties between serving the company or their dominus. Company Law tries to mitigate it through the duty of independence (art. 228 d) LSC), or abstention rules forconflicts of interest (art. 228 c) LSC). Second, the competitor doctrine, enshrined inarticles 229.1 f) and 224.2 LSC, applies only to minority directors, and works as a shield to prevent these minority directors from entering the board without the consent of the controlling shareholder. Ultimately, the pro-majority biasprevailing among the Spanish doctrine leads to an asymmetric treatment of controlling directors compared to minority directors and lowers the quality of corporate governance |
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