How do Managerial Entrenchment and Expropriation Affect Control Mechanisms?
[EN] This paper proposes a new empirical approach that allows us to appropriately control for the non-linearities of ownership with respect to firm value when analysing how managerial entrenchment and expropriation affect the relations among control mechanisms. Unlike findings in previous US-based s...
| Autores: | , , |
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| Tipo de recurso: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2003 |
| País: | España |
| Institución: | Universidad de Salamanca (USAL) |
| Repositorio: | GREDOS. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Salamanca |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:gredos.usal.es:10366/149769 |
| Acceso en línea: | http://hdl.handle.net/10366/149769 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palabra clave: | ownership concentration Insider ownership Debt Expropriation Entrenchment Dividends 5311 Organización y Dirección de Empresas 5311.02 Gestión Financiera |
| Sumario: | [EN] This paper proposes a new empirical approach that allows us to appropriately control for the non-linearities of ownership with respect to firm value when analysing how managerial entrenchment and expropriation affect the relations among control mechanisms. Unlike findings in previous US-based studies, which in general point to substitutability among mechanisms, our results show that control mechanisms (especially insider ownership, debt and dividends) are used in a complementary way by Spanish firms. In addition, this complementarity is only observed when the interests of managers and owners converge, but not when there are controlling owners - insiders or outsiders - whose interests need not coincide with those of minority shareholders. Therefore, managerial entrenchment and expropriation effects do influence the relationship among agency-cost control. |
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