When half a boycott makes a winner: on Eurovision voting
Boycotts are meant to isolate. A pushback -however small- is almost always inevitable. In settings with many alternatives, boycott tends to be diffuse, while counter-support is concentrated. This asymmetry can translate into a great advantage for the boycotted party.
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| Formato: | artículo |
| Estado: | Versión publicada |
| Fecha de publicación: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | Universitat Pompeu Fabra |
| Repositorio: | Repositorio Digital de la UPF |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:repositori.upf.edu:10230/71615 |
| Acesso em linha: | http://hdl.handle.net/10230/71615 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2025.112639 |
| Access Level: | acceso abierto |
| Palavra-chave: | Boycott Weak backlash Voting Coordination failure |
| Resumo: | Boycotts are meant to isolate. A pushback -however small- is almost always inevitable. In settings with many alternatives, boycott tends to be diffuse, while counter-support is concentrated. This asymmetry can translate into a great advantage for the boycotted party. |
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