Cascades tolerance of scale-free networks with attack cost

Network robustness against cascades is a major topic in the fields of complex networks. In this paper, we propose an attack-cost-based cascading failure model, where the attack cost of nodes is positively related to its degree. We compare four attacking strategies: the random removal strategy (RRS),...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Hong, Chen, Yin, Nai-Yu, He, Ning, Lordan González, Oriol|||0000-0002-7376-5253, Sallán Leyes, José María|||0000-0002-4835-0152
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2017
País:España
Institución:Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)
Repositorio:UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Idioma:inglés
OAI Identifier:oai:upcommons.upc.edu:2117/109280
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/2117/109280
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:Network analysis (Planning)
System analysis
Computer algorithms
Network robustness
Cascading failures
Genetic algorithm
Attack cost
Anàlisi de xarxes (Planificació)
Anàlisi de sistemes
Algorismes genètics
Àrees temàtiques de la UPC::Economia i organització d'empreses::Direcció d'operacions
Descripción
Sumario:Network robustness against cascades is a major topic in the fields of complex networks. In this paper, we propose an attack-cost-based cascading failure model, where the attack cost of nodes is positively related to its degree. We compare four attacking strategies: the random removal strategy (RRS), the low-degree removal strategy (LDRS), the high-degree removal strategy (HDRS) and the genetic algorithm removal strategy (GARS). It is shown that the network robustness against cascades is heavily affected by attack costs and the network exhibits the weakest robustness under GARS. We also explore the relationship between the network robustness and tolerance parameter under these attacking strategies. The simulation results indicate that the critical value of tolerance parameter under GARS is greatly larger than that of other attacking strategies. Our work can supply insight into the robustness and vulnerability of complex networks corresponding to cascading failures.