The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and Beyond

Largely missing from the extensive discussions of populism and illiberal democracy is the emerging question of 21st century constitutionalism. Nowadays, it is hard to see relevant constitutional changes without a strong appeal to direct popular political participation. Institutional mechanisms such...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autores: Verdugo, Sergio, Issacharoff, Samuel
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2023
País:España
Institución:IE
Repositorio:Repositorio IE
OAI Identifier:oai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/3782
Acceso en línea:http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4323864
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3782
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:59 Ciencia Política::5906 Sociología política
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
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spelling The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and BeyondVerdugo, SergioIssacharoff, Samuel59 Ciencia Política::5906 Sociología políticaODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidasLargely missing from the extensive discussions of populism and illiberal democracy is the emerging question of 21st century constitutionalism. Nowadays, it is hard to see relevant constitutional changes without a strong appeal to direct popular political participation. Institutional mechanisms such as referenda, citizens’ assemblies, and constitutional conventions emerge as near universal parts of the canon of every academic and political discussion on how constitutions should be enacted and amended. This article’s aim is to offer a cautionary approach to the way participatory mechanisms can work in constitution-making and to stress the difference between the power to ratify constitutional proposals and the forms of governance that must follow. Constitutions are necessarily the product of political and historical moments. Ours is a time of populist challenge to the restraining institutions of governance. We show how constitution-making processes taking place under existing political contexts can fail not simply despite the existence of participatory mechanisms but in large part because of them. We identify two types of failures. First, the authoritarian failure, which consists of constitution-making processes that lead to authoritarian outcomes or become part of democratic backsliding or abusive processes. Second, the activation failure, by which constitutions are not passed. This failure is likely to take place when reforms attempt to bypass established, functioning institutional actors, whatever their flaws. This article will turn to the recent failure of the Chilean constitutional effort (2022) to focus on the historic roles of non-state organizations, most notably political parties, in stabilizing and legitimizing successful democratic governance. The current trend in constitutional formation, reflecting the ascending populist ethos of our times, is to bypass the representative institutions that do exist in favor of a pact between the state and an ill-defined entity known as the people. The tendency of political power without structural checks and balances to lead to autocracy is reasonably well understood. But Chile, together with other recent examples of failed constitutional processes, highlights the risks of activation failure in democratic settings—i.e., contexts in which representative institutions exist and function, though flawed. We will argue that a relevant condition to prevent the activation failure is to use the constitution-making processes as an opportunity to strengthen the political party system by including the existing parties in the process. Success stories of constitution-making have widely shown the advantages that political compromises among rival actors bring in terms of procedural legitimacy—wide acceptance of the constitution’s content—and substantive legitimacy—the inclination of those processes in promoting politically liberal institutions but little has been said about activation failures lacking those features. This article seeks to fill this gap.yesPublishedUniversity of Miami Law Reviewhttps://ror.org/02jjdwm75202520252023info:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfapplication/pdfhttp://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4323864https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3782reponame:Repositorio IEinstname:IEInglésIE Law SchoolIE UniversityPublic Law & Global GovernanceAttribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internationalhttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:repositorio.ie.edu:20.500.14417/37822026-06-15T12:40:57Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and Beyond
title The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and Beyond
spellingShingle The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and Beyond
Verdugo, Sergio
59 Ciencia Política::5906 Sociología política
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
title_short The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and Beyond
title_full The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and Beyond
title_fullStr The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and Beyond
title_full_unstemmed The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and Beyond
title_sort The Uncertain Future of Constitutional Democracy in the Era of Populism: Chile and Beyond
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Verdugo, Sergio
Issacharoff, Samuel
author Verdugo, Sergio
author_facet Verdugo, Sergio
Issacharoff, Samuel
author_role author
author2 Issacharoff, Samuel
author2_role author
dc.contributor.none.fl_str_mv https://ror.org/02jjdwm75
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv 59 Ciencia Política::5906 Sociología política
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
topic 59 Ciencia Política::5906 Sociología política
ODS 16 - Paz, justicia e instituciones sólidas
description Largely missing from the extensive discussions of populism and illiberal democracy is the emerging question of 21st century constitutionalism. Nowadays, it is hard to see relevant constitutional changes without a strong appeal to direct popular political participation. Institutional mechanisms such as referenda, citizens’ assemblies, and constitutional conventions emerge as near universal parts of the canon of every academic and political discussion on how constitutions should be enacted and amended. This article’s aim is to offer a cautionary approach to the way participatory mechanisms can work in constitution-making and to stress the difference between the power to ratify constitutional proposals and the forms of governance that must follow. Constitutions are necessarily the product of political and historical moments. Ours is a time of populist challenge to the restraining institutions of governance. We show how constitution-making processes taking place under existing political contexts can fail not simply despite the existence of participatory mechanisms but in large part because of them. We identify two types of failures. First, the authoritarian failure, which consists of constitution-making processes that lead to authoritarian outcomes or become part of democratic backsliding or abusive processes. Second, the activation failure, by which constitutions are not passed. This failure is likely to take place when reforms attempt to bypass established, functioning institutional actors, whatever their flaws. This article will turn to the recent failure of the Chilean constitutional effort (2022) to focus on the historic roles of non-state organizations, most notably political parties, in stabilizing and legitimizing successful democratic governance. The current trend in constitutional formation, reflecting the ascending populist ethos of our times, is to bypass the representative institutions that do exist in favor of a pact between the state and an ill-defined entity known as the people. The tendency of political power without structural checks and balances to lead to autocracy is reasonably well understood. But Chile, together with other recent examples of failed constitutional processes, highlights the risks of activation failure in democratic settings—i.e., contexts in which representative institutions exist and function, though flawed. We will argue that a relevant condition to prevent the activation failure is to use the constitution-making processes as an opportunity to strengthen the political party system by including the existing parties in the process. Success stories of constitution-making have widely shown the advantages that political compromises among rival actors bring in terms of procedural legitimacy—wide acceptance of the constitution’s content—and substantive legitimacy—the inclination of those processes in promoting politically liberal institutions but little has been said about activation failures lacking those features. This article seeks to fill this gap.
publishDate 2023
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2023
2025
2025
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
format article
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4323864
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3782
url http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4323864
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14417/3782
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv IE Law School
IE University
Public Law & Global Governance
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.en
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/deed.en
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv University of Miami Law Review
publisher.none.fl_str_mv University of Miami Law Review
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv reponame:Repositorio IE
instname:IE
instname_str IE
reponame_str Repositorio IE
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