Repeated Contests with Commitment
Contestants fight in repeated contests and privately know whether they are rational utility maximizers or automatons committed to always fighting “all-in.” In the unique symmetric equilibrium, rational contestants fight all-in in early contests as doing so buys a beneficial “all-in look” that intimi...
| Autores: | , |
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| Tipo de documento: | artigo |
| Data de publicação: | 2025 |
| País: | España |
| Recursos: | CUNEF Universidad |
| Repositório: | OpenCUNEF |
| Idioma: | inglês |
| OAI Identifier: | oai:open.cunef.edu:20.500.14861/15 |
| Acesso em linha: | https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14861/15 |
| Access Level: | Acceso aberto |
| Palavra-chave: | Repeated all-pay auction Contests Private information |
| Resumo: | Contestants fight in repeated contests and privately know whether they are rational utility maximizers or automatons committed to always fighting “all-in.” In the unique symmetric equilibrium, rational contestants fight all-in in early contests as doing so buys a beneficial “all-in look” that intimidates rivals in future contests. In equilibrium, several structural differences emerge between periods in which multiple contestants maintain an all-in look, as opposed to one: most prominently, only in the former case aggregate efforts may exceed the per-period prize, and only in the latter payoffs can be positive. |
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