Political centralization and government accountability

This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autores: Boffa, Federico, Piolatto, Amedeo, Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
Formato: artículo
Estado:Versión aceptada para publicación
Fecha de publicación:2016
País:España
Recursos:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
Repositorio:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
OAI Identifier:oai:recercat.cat:2445/111666
Acesso em linha:https://hdl.handle.net/2445/111666
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palavra-chave:Federalisme
Govern
Descentralització administrativa
Federalism
Government
Decentralization in government
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spelling Political centralization and government accountabilityBoffa, FedericoPiolatto, AmedeoPonzetto, Giacomo A. M.FederalismeGovernDescentralització administrativaFederalismGovernmentDecentralization in governmentThis article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions.Oxford University Press2017201820162017info:eu-repo/semantics/articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion42 p.application/pdfhttps://hdl.handle.net/2445/111666Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunyainstname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)InglésVersió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv035Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2016, vol. 131, num. 1, p. 381-422https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv035(c) President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2016info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:recercat.cat:2445/1116662026-05-29T05:05:01Z
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Political centralization and government accountability
title Political centralization and government accountability
spellingShingle Political centralization and government accountability
Boffa, Federico
Federalisme
Govern
Descentralització administrativa
Federalism
Government
Decentralization in government
title_short Political centralization and government accountability
title_full Political centralization and government accountability
title_fullStr Political centralization and government accountability
title_full_unstemmed Political centralization and government accountability
title_sort Political centralization and government accountability
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Boffa, Federico
Piolatto, Amedeo
Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
author Boffa, Federico
author_facet Boffa, Federico
Piolatto, Amedeo
Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
author_role author
author2 Piolatto, Amedeo
Ponzetto, Giacomo A. M.
author2_role author
author
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Federalisme
Govern
Descentralització administrativa
Federalism
Government
Decentralization in government
topic Federalisme
Govern
Descentralització administrativa
Federalism
Government
Decentralization in government
description This article explains why decentralization can undermine accountability and answers three questions: what determines if power should be centralized or decentralized when regions are heterogeneous? How many levels of government should there be? How should state borders be drawn? We develop a model of political agency in which voters differ in their ability to monitor rent-seeking politicians. We find that rent extraction is a decreasing and convex function of the share of informed voters, because voter information improves monitoring but also reduces the appeal of holding office. As a result, information heterogeneity pushes toward centralization to reduce rent extraction. Taste heterogeneity pulls instead toward decentralization to match local preferences. Our model thus implies that optimal borders should cluster by tastes but ensure diversity of information. We also find economies of scope in accountability that explain why multiplying government tiers harms efficiency. A single government in charge of many policies has better incentives than many special-purpose governments splitting its budget and responsibilities. Hence, a federal system is desirable only if information varies enough across regions.
publishDate 2016
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2016
2017
2017
2018
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/article
info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion
format article
status_str acceptedVersion
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv https://hdl.handle.net/2445/111666
url https://hdl.handle.net/2445/111666
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv Inglés
language_invalid_str_mv Inglés
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv Versió postprint del document publicat a: https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv035
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2016, vol. 131, num. 1, p. 381-422
https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjv035
dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv (c) President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2016
info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
rights_invalid_str_mv (c) President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2016
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv 42 p.
application/pdf
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Oxford University Press
dc.source.none.fl_str_mv Articles publicats en revistes (Economia)
reponame:Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
instname:Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
instname_str Varias* (Consorci de Biblioteques Universitáries de Catalunya, Centre de Serveis Científics i Acadèmics de Catalunya)
reponame_str Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
collection Recercat. Dipósit de la Recerca de Catalunya
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
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score 15.812429

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