El concepto de la intuición categorial en Husserl

Dieter Lohmar: Husserls concept of categorial intuition Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition is presented in the 6.th Logical Investigation. It starts with the question: what fulfills the specific categorial elements of thinking and language? Husserl’s analysis of the structure of categorial int...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Autor: Lohmar, D. (Dieter)|||/items/126ccf20-d274-4154-b590-16e5d0dd8a00
Tipo de recurso: artículo
Fecha de publicación:2004
País:España
Institución:Universidad de Navarra
Repositorio:Dadun. Depósito Académico Digital de la Universidad de Navarra
Idioma:español
OAI Identifier:oai:dadun.unav.edu:10171/4418
Acceso en línea:https://hdl.handle.net/10171/4418
Access Level:acceso abierto
Palabra clave:intuición categorial
Husserl, Edmund
fenomenología
Descripción
Sumario:Dieter Lohmar: Husserls concept of categorial intuition Husserl’s theory of categorial intuition is presented in the 6.th Logical Investigation. It starts with the question: what fulfills the specific categorial elements of thinking and language? Husserl’s analysis of the structure of categorial intuition opens up with a confrontation of simple acts of perception in contrast with complex, founded acts of categorial intuition. This is illustrated by the difference between simple synthesis of identification in continuous perception in contrast to the thematic identification of the same object. Then the crucial “fulfilling” function of the “synthesis of coincidence” between implicite and explicite (partial-)intentions in categorial intuition is very carefuly presented. The source, the special character and the special mode of givenness of the synthesis of coincidence is characterized: They are non-sensual contents which are nevertheless given to us in the transition of the perceptual acts within the whole structure of a categorial act. This leds to a detailled categorial act. In the end there is to be found a critical evaluation of the procedure of seeing essenses (Wesensschau) viewed as a special case of categorial intuition. The performance and the limits of this central phenomenological method are discussed.